parks are suggestive of changing paradigms of stormwater management worldwide that stress the capacity of the natural landscape to retain and delay the movement of rainwater.
While the majority of linear parks in the city are small-scale interventions into the landscape, the PVT is on an entirely different scale. Ultimately designed to bridge a series of municipalities, it will be the largest linear park in the world upon completion, stretching for roughly 75 kilometers to the source of the Tietê River near the town of Salesópolis.
Designed to dampen flood peaks that have been heightened by extensive development in the region, the PVT proposes the renaturalization of the Tietê's banks in the eastern edge of the city. Yet due to the presence of low-income communities along the Tietê in a region commonly referred to as the várzea [floodplain] 1 (see figure 1), the project calls for extensive population displacements. Specifically, the PVT calls for the removal of 8,000 families
[roughly 40,000 people] to return the Tietê's banks to their historic function as flood regulators (Governo do Estado de São Paulo, 2010) . As with other linear park projects in the city, the PVT has become a flashpoint in conflicts between housing movements and the state (Observatório de remoções, 2012) . This paper considers the PVT's plans for removals in light of ongoing work in geography and urban political ecology on the relationship between environmental interventions and processes of displacement (See, for instance, Banzhaf and Walsh, 2006; Checker, 2011; Dooling, 2009; Doshi, 2013; Patrick, 2014; Wachsmuth, Cohen, & Angelo, 2016) . Engaging with the specificities of the PVT allows for a consideration of the processes through which removals are both legally articulated as well as carried out. My assessment of the PVT subsequently draws both from broader political-economic understandings of the city's urban dynamics as well as the environmental logics that are used to justify the project. What is happening in São Paulo around the PVT is a clear case of environment-induced displacement. Yet in contrast to a normative argument that all retreat from environmentally fragile areas is a form of dispossession, I show how displacement in this case becomes specifically risky for low-income residents living in precarious situations (See Koslov, 2016 , on retreat and displacement). This is not a product of removals as such but rather the specific forms through which removals are being conducted.
The organization of this paper is as follows. First, I consider the dynamics of displacement that mark the project, and critically analyze the discourse around risk that underlies ongoing efforts to remove populations in the region. I focus on risk due to the fact that it is one of the foundational forms through which environmental improvements are justified in São Paulo and beyond (See, e.g. Zeiderman, 2016) . I take issue with the claim that removal in its current form will render residents' lives less risky, and argue that São Paulo's state government has operated without transparency in developing the project. Second, I
discuss how communities have responded to the threat of evictions, and focus on moments of small-scale political mobilization against removal. I note that the cost and complication of removals gives opening for social movements interested in stopping, or at least stalling, removals. I conclude the paper by calling for an approach to governance in peripheral landscapes that takes seriously the histories of collective infrastructural provisioning and autoconstructed housing that have marked these landscapes for decades.
The Political Ecology of Housing in São Paulo
São Paulo is a city of roughly twenty million people, marked by an enduring disconnect between a broadly formalized urban core and an increasingly heterogeneous periphery (See Caldeira, 2001; Rolnik, 2015) . Throughout the twentieth century, the city underwent an expansive process of peripheralization that was marked by the persistent settlement of lowincome communities at the city's edge (Caldeira, 2001 (Caldeira, , 2016 Holston, 1991 Holston, , 2008 Keck, 2002; Kovarick, 2009; Rolnik, 1997) . Coupled with the related processes of autoconstruction and occupation, in which residents slowly built homes and communities by hand, the result was that São Paulo expanded dramatically throughout the twentieth century but primarily in its peripheries. Over time, expansion would yield formalization and consolidation, resulting in a patchwork peripheral landscape that threads between the informal and the formal, where poverty coexists with decades of economic growth and neighborhood consolidation. São Paulo's bifurcated landscape of center and periphery is directly connected to its waterways (see, for instance, de Sant'Anna, 2007; Jacobi, Fracalanza & Silva-Sánchez, 2015; Jorge, 2006; Seabra, 1987; Silva, 2012) . While the locating of low-income neighborhoods in floodplains has marked the city since its inception (See Jorge, 2006) , central city expulsion furthered this process. Low-income residents were pushed to settle in parts of the city that existed outside of the housing market, including areas at risk of flooding or landslides, public lands, and green spaces. The occupation of riverbanks and other floodprone landscapes is subsequently a constant process in the city, yielding an intimate relationship between inequality, flooding, and formal illegality. This has implications for environmental management, especially in regards to water quality. The locating of favelas and other forms of semi-formal urban typologies in floodplains and on riverbanks can complicate efforts to implant sanitary infrastructure, and often forces low-income residents to trade stable housing for frequent flooding (See Barboza, 2015) .
Housing remains a vital area of political struggle in São Paulo (See Boulos, 2014; Cohen, 2016 Cohen, , 2017 Rolnik, 2015) . Current estimates place São Paulo's housing deficit at 230,000 units, a figure that ignores the precariousness that marks much of the city's housing more generally. In São Paulo, this is especially noticeable given the high rates of vacancy in the urban core, where hundreds of thousands of habitable apartments remain tied up in real estate speculation and vacancy. 2010 census figures indicated that roughly 10% of São
Paulo's population lives in favelas and other irregular settlements, up from less than 6% in 1991 (See Marques, 2014; Pasternak and D'Ottaviano, 2016) .
Methods and Conceptual Framing
The entangling of water and inequality that makes up São Paulo's landscape requires an approach that is attentive to the complex, overlapping dynamics of governance that materialize in the city. This paper draws extensively from urban political ecology (UPE) in order to consider how the benefits and burdens of the city's watery landscape are mediated by broader political and social dynamics in the city (See, for instance, Bakker, 2010; Gabriel, 2014; Heynen, 2013; Rademacher, 2011; Ranganathan, 2014; Swyngedouw and Heynen, 2003; Swyngedouw, 2004 ). An approach drawn from UPE highlights the differentiated results of environmental interventions into cities, and considers the forms through which urban ecologies are mediated along lines of race, class, gender, and geography. I further draw from the insights found in the literature on environment-induced displacement, which has considered the processes through which environmental initiatives around sustainability have led to displacement of lower-income populations throughout the global North and South (See, e.g. Banzhaf and Walsh, 2006; Checker, 2011; Dooling, 2009; Doshi, 2013; Patrick, 2014; Zeiderman, 2016) . While much of this literature has considered environmental interventions in urban contexts marked by gentrification, this paper expands on this literature through an analysis of displacement within a southern city defined by histories of autoconstruction, inconsistent land tenure, and peripheral urbanization processes 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 (See Caldeira, 2016) . Finally, this project engages with the broad work in the politics of infrastructure (See, e.g. Anand, 2017; Barnes, 2016; Caldeira, 2016; Carse, 2012; Furlong, 2014; Graham and Marvin, 2011; Holston, 2008; Roy, 2005 Roy, , 2009 Silver, 2014; Truelove, 2011 ) through a consideration of how the urban socio-natural landscape is held together through processes of maintenance and repair that cut across binaries of water and land (Barnes, 2016; Graham & Thrift, 2007; Mandelman, 2015; Mathur and da Cunha, 2014; Thrift, 2005) . In doing so, the paper engages with the nature of contemporary governance in São Paulo and calls for further attention into what Angel and Loftus (2017) provocatively refer to as the "the set of socio-ecological relations that goes by the name of the state" (See too Angel, 2017; Harris, 2017 Abers and Keck, 2014; Keck, 2002; Porto, 2012; Silva, 2012 
Situating The Parque Várzeas do Tietê
The PVT proposes an extensive green space that will preserve the riverbanks of the Tietê in eastern São Paulo and bring green space to underserved populations. As the
Department of Water and Electrical Energy notes on the project's website:
The principal objective of the program is to recuperate and protect the function of the river's várzeas, in addition to functioning as a regulator of floods, saving lives and people's property. At the same time, the Tietê Floodplain Park proposes a gigantic leisure area for the population (Departamento de Águas e Energia Elétrica, 2015).
The PVT is the exception to the generally small-scale, underfunded linear parks that mark riverbank green space initiatives in São Paulo (See Jacobi et al, 2015; Soares, 2014) . It boasts a much more robust budget than other park projects, with a budget of over 500 million …worst flood that we have confronted here. What happened? Look, the river filled up…and it had nowhere to spread its water. It spread into the houses, or the houses occupied where it needed to spread. And so this project here, it creates a physical barrier, which is a park lane, a bike lane, to secure, to maintain the distance from the river (emphasis mine).
The PVT attempts to reorient the complex fluvial landscape of the várzea in the service of flood prevention and environmental remediation, to develop a more permanent solution to flood management in the region. The project proposes the construction of a series of
Peer Review Copy The PVT is in line with ongoing shifts in the management of stormwater infrastructure.
In recent decades, hydrological engineers have attempted to reduce the cumulative water that flows through São Paulo through the use of detention ponds and occasional riverbank naturalization (See Canholi, 2005; Júnior, 2011) . In doing so, engineers have overseen a shift in flood prevention that peripheralizes infrastructure and scales up the field of intervention.
A product of scientific knowledge as well as budgetary constraints and land pricing, this is one form of how flood management in the city is often inserted into broader dynamics of center and periphery that mark the city. Peripheral communities regularly allege that flood prevention policies use the urban periphery as a type of sacrifice zone for the broader city through the placement of detention ponds [piscinões], even as they call for sustained investment into the recurrent problem of flooding.
The PVT continues this logic: It is specifically designed to clear the riverbanks in the eastern periphery of the city in order to reduce the effects of flooding downstream. Its specific purpose is to expand the absorptive capacity of the river channel and dampen flood peaks, whose dynamics have shifted given the intensity of occupation in the region and the increased dramatically in the last three decades due to the lowering of the absorptive capacity of the landscape. This is occurring at the same time that the further deepening of the Tietê's channel is allegedly no longer physically possible, meaning that the only way to prevent flooding in the urban core is to remake the landscape of the várzea on a massive scale.
Riskiness and Removal
The PVT calls for the removal of 8,000 families (roughly 40,000 people). These removals are largely justified as a way to reduce flooding and take residents out of risk. DAEE and the state government argue that informal settlements in environmentally fragile areas provoke erosive processes and alter flood regimes, while also subjecting residents to flooding and waterborne diseases. Flood prevention is subsequently the primary justification for popular resettlement, but the PVT also stresses the benefits of resettlement in state-built housing complexes. As Marta, the manager of the project, noted in response to a question about the benefits of removals:
Because who leaves will have housing with resources. It might be smaller, but you're [not] on the edge of the river. It has sewage, it has internet, light, everything. And who stays has a park in front of them. And those who leave also have a park they can visit (Marta, personal interview, 2014).
Removals in this sense are not just ecologically necessary but seen to benefit communities with unclear land tenure and proximity to environmental risk. In the resettlement plan for the PVT, for instance, the authors write:
There is inadequate sewage collection, trash collection and water provisioning, factors of environmental degradation that turn the areas unhealthy and expose the population to sanitary risks. This situation is most critical in the flood season when thousands of residences are invaded by water that is often polluted and carries disease vectors (Governo do Estado de São Paulo, 2010: 13) . In these framings, DAEE reflects changing articulations of favela removals throughout São
Paulo that stress the benefits of resettlement for affected populations.
While in agreement about the riskiness of living in the Tietê's floodplain, I argue that discourses of risk that are used to justify popular removal are inconsistent given the forms through which resettlement is being carried out in the region. I argue that the removal of precarious communities in the várzea will produce risker lives for residents due to the lack of transparency in the process and the inability to take seriously residents' immediate and longterm needs. This argument takes on special relevancy given the fact that risk reduction and This has produced a situation in which many previously removed residents have returned to the area (See Figure 4) Even successfully completed removals can be fraught due to the dynamics of delay and illdefined housing policy. The construction of public housing complexes in Brazil is notoriously low quality (See, for instance, Rolnik, 2015) . Indeed, in an investigative reporting detailing the removals of communities in the várzea in the wake of 2009 and 2010 flooding, Pacheco (2012) found that many residents were dissatisfied with the housing units that had been built. More broadly, the locations of these projects are often far from the urban core, increasing travel times and further marginalizing peripheral residents into distant locations.
Relocation can often lead to deeper questions of security and safety for displaced residents.
Furthermore, removals and the associated delays can often cause banal issues that have profound effects, such as questions of where to store possessions during periods of movement. For low-income residents, these sorts of seemingly minor delays can add up in profound ways. Related is the degree to which rent subsidies generate their own forms of expulsion. In lieu of actual housing, the distribution of rent subsidies in the várzea had the perverse effect of encouraging speculation and raising local rents. As local activist Marzeni noted in a 2016 interview, this was especially pronounced in places like Jardim Pantanal as nearby residents knew about the continued subsidies and would subsequently attempt to charge displaced residents more.
In spite of all these dynamics, many residents of the várzea that I spoke with in 2014 and 2015 were not opposed to removals in all cases. To say that all low-income residents in São Paulo would prefer to stay put ignores the heterogeneity of peripheral communities and the broader degree to which many housing movements are actively engaging with the state.
But many residents and activists were and are opposed to removals that are conducted piecemeal and without an adequate plan. As activist Vagner put it in 2014, residents wanted a process that was "more humane. Conflicts over removals are often provoked by the details and the lack of consistent follow through on behalf of the state, rather than the threat of removal as such. While many residents were clear that they did not intend to be moved, others understood the dynamics of risk and resettlement and understood that they were living in areas of environmental protection that exposed them to danger. Following framing of slumdwellers' embodied understandings of themselves as out of place, we might say that some peripheral residents of São Paulo had come to find environmental arguments convincing and became convinced of their insuitability to live in the Tietê's floodplain. As a result, many residents grew excited about the possibilities of subsidized housing and the chance to move out of the region. Activists rarely articulated politics of wholesale resistance to resettlement in state housing projects. Instead, they asked repeatedly for timeframes, for information, for details on the projects, and for conversation. These requests were rarely met.
Instead, throughout 2014 and 2015, I witnessed a definitive lack of transparency on behalf of DAEE This was in spite of the fact that employees of DAEE understood the effects of these projects and the logistical as well as ethical difficulties of removing populations. As Celso, a DAEE employee, noted when discussing the proposed removals of nearly 5,000 families in the municipality of Guarulhos: "It'll be a little delayed, and maybe it won't even be us that does it. And part of it we might not even be able to do." When I asked further, he noted:
[It's] difficult, complicated…It will be very expensive, it will be traumatic, and it won't be an easy job to do in one phase. Maybe the project will have to be restudied, reformulated, replanned or suddenly the possibility of some financing from the government will appear and we'll be able to do it one pass…. So: do it and finish it, or do it and keep having to redo it because occupation is constant. You pass by today and there is no shack and tomorrow there is one.
Given the nature of state fragmentation in São Paulo, collaboration between housing and environmental secretaries is often conflictual. This produces a situation in which housing is seen as a secondary concern, one that is out-sourced to specific entities. The result is a lack of coherency within projects that has serious implications for communities slated for removal.
This is a point made by the limited academic work on the development of the PVT.
Pereira (2012:6), for instance, notes that:
In spite of the affirmation that areas for relocation are still to be identified, in the actual stages of the project they are precisely defined. But we do not have mention of the effective initiation of the projects nor of the communication to the hundreds of families representatives in the region. Our purpose of the walk was to chart the purported line that demarcated eventual removals in the region, part of a broader solidarity-building effort on behalf of the resident-activists. As we walked, we used two maps, one that the local activists were using and another that was in the hands of some students at the university of São
Paulo. At one point, we reached a moment where the maps diverged (figure 5), where one showed a line going straight, and one veered, performing a detour before eventually meeting back up with the line that we were on. This suggested that an alteration had been made to the original plan, that determinations of who would be removed were still being decided, and that residents were not being given adequate information. Given that this line determines who will be forced to leave a long-standing community, this lack of clarity had and has potentially very real consequences for specific people.
This moment of cartographic anxiety was suggestive of the broader lack of transparency in the implementation of the PVT, a sticking point that consistently circulated in the communities of the várzea during 2014 and 2015. The sense that the state knew what they were doing permeated discussions, even as the state's own practice seemed to suggest otherwise. If risk is one of the defining discourses through which this project is being articulated, a lack of transparency in its implementation makes clear that its development will produce riskier lives for displaced residents. Without a transparent policy of engagement that takes seriously the multilayered dynamics of risk that accompany resettlement, projects like the PVT will yield risker situations for residents unless plans are made to avoid construction delays, to safeguard possessions, and to develop coherent housing plans that understand residents' needs and desires in real ways. The PVT makes clear that even if some number of removals can be justified through hydrological logics, the form through which residents have been treated is cause for serious concern.
Democratizing the várzea and the governance of relational landscapes
In response to ongoing processes of displacement, the várzea has witnessed periodic was immediately clear that these residents-largely precarious, often in situations of serious risk-did not want the promised apartments, understood that they were too poor for even subsidized housing, and were not excited about the thought of a park. Two strategies were discussed for going forward: the development of a media campaign dedicated to highlighting both flooding and evictions, and appeals to the public ministry. In a meeting two months later, Anderson demonstrated this approach by engaging in some political theater, calling the scheduler for the mayor's office on speakerphone to demand a meeting. He was politely informed that schedule requests are typically done over email.
These moments of small-scale direct action are representative of much of the current shape of peripheral political mobilization in São Paulo that I was witness to throughout 2014 and 2015, the sorts of everyday politics that exist alongside more visible manifestations. They are not representative of mass mobilizations against evictions, but rather smaller mobilizations in the context of uncertain possibilities. While evaluating their success remains to be seen, it was clear from engagements with employees of DAEE that pressure was having some effect as employees repeatedly expressed fatigue with local pastors and activists.
In a meeting with regional representatives in September 2016, for instance, Marta, the manager of the PVT, noted that removals deemed necessary for the development of a polder in Vila Itaim had been lowered to 129 families from 394 due to pressure from both activists as well as concerns from the municipal secretary of housing (Jornal da Várzea, 2016).
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While being clear that autoconstruction emerges from inequality and limited options, I
take inspiration from autoconstruction for thinking through approaches to environmental improvement in landscapes like the várzea for two reasons: First, it demonstrates a processual approach to landscape creation and a skepticism of large-scale planning in favor of what Pieterse (2013) calls "radical incrementalism;" And, second, it articulates an approach to the urban fabric that is, at heart, about appropriation, prioritizing the right to Pardue, 2015) , ongoing pushes towards austerity at both the federal and local level mean that it is unlikely that broad changes to the city's urban pattern will occur in the years to come. Indeed, the recent election of Joao Doria as mayor of the city makes clear that a progressive, pro-poor housing policy will not be a priority in the years to come. As such, engaging with landscapes like the várzea requires taking seriously the improvisational forms through which landscapes are produced, and asking how those might be folded into specific responses to flooding and environmental risk governance.
Osvaldo, a long-standing activist in the várzea, gives voice to this:
I think the government has to create more serious policies, you know? They have to actually think about the local community, the environment of that community. And there are mechanisms for that. Its not impossible to do…. The people can stay, you can, instead of planting, instead of cementing the yards: grass, ecological sidewalks, ecological pavement, everything sustainable, a project of environmental education, create a partnership with the university of São Paulo, create the incubator, hire people who live in were not parks or new promises, but rather consistency and follow through on plans previously made. Without a sustained commitment to the region's residents that takes seriously their rights to stay and the histories of the landscapes they inhabit, projects like the PVT will only hurt residents.
Conclusion
Nearly ten years in, the PVT has little to show for it beyond a series of designs, an 11 kilometer bike lane, and one completed park space that is only nominally connected to the project. The three primary núcleos for the project that have been planned-Itaim Biacica, Vila Any, and Jardim Helena-are all in development, with Itaim Biacica being the only one to show evidence of construction as of December 2016. While project employees made clear to me that the project was progressing, fiscal and political crises in Brazil suggest that the project may remain unrealized in the years to come. In addition to the broader logistical and financial costs of resettling populations deemed at risk, the underlying dynamics of land ownership complicate project plans. The lack of a consistent and transparent policy process in the várzea has generated a project that is delayed and possibly at risk of failure. As the project stalls, the várzea floods. In March 2016 as well as January 2017, flooding returned dramatically to the communities of the region, damaging property and livelihoods again.
Water surged out of the local streams that crisscross the region and out of the stormsewers, provoking property damage and losses more broadly. The continued reality of flooding in the region is a dramatic indictment of the PVT's stalled ambitions and one more example of an approach to water management in Brazil that has reached its limit.
In this paper, I considered the case of the PVT in light of broader concerns about the link between environmental improvement and displacement. I considered the lack of transparency in the implementation of the PVT, and critiqued the broader idea that its development will yield less risky lives for affected communities. I argued that the project threatens to put low-income residents into situations of heightened rather than lessened risk and critiqued what I saw as a lack of transparency in the implementation of the project. I discussed moments of resistance to removal and further argued that models for how to 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 delink displacement from environmental improvement could find inspiration from existing processes of autoconstruction. I argued that autoconstruction was both a form of material politics as well as a metaphor for a different kind of state practice, one that takes seriously the fiscal and institutional limits in places that have long existed as the margin of formal governance.
The case of São Paulo is indicative of urban landscapes produced through uneven processes of consolidation, where efforts to embed necessary infrastructures are complicated by the logistical and financial dynamics of state capacity. In this sense, while being clear about the particularities of São Paulo's urban form, I suggest that insights learned there could speak to other southern cities that combine long histories of informal urbanization, democratic political regimes, and fiscal constraints. Of course, preserving the particularity of Brazil's democracy and history of urbanization is important, and I do not suggest that lessons learned from São Paulo should be uncritically used to intervene into other cities. I do, however, suggest that a comparative approach that draws from southern theory requires us to take seriously the lessons learned from cities like São Paulo in thinking through the global dynamics of contemporary urban governance (Robinson, 2002; Roy, 2007 ; See too Hart, 2006 Hart, , 2016 . In this sense, I argue that São Paulo's case could offer lessons for other southern (and northern) cities battling flooding alongside dispossession, while being clear that the form that these interventions will subsequently take will of course depend on local environmental and political dynamics. Breaking the link between social displacement and environmental upgrading requires that we take seriously the intimate, banal ways in which urban landscapes are made and remade by those who inhabit them. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 
